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Much of what we believe we know, we know through the testimony of others (Coady,
1992). While there has been long-standing evidence that people are sensitive to the
characteristics of the sources of testimony, for example in the context of persuasion,
researchers have only recently begun to explore the wider implications of source reliability
considerations for the nature of our beliefs. Likewise, much remains to be established
concerning what factors influence source reliability. In this paper, we examine, both
theoretically and empirically, the implications of usingmessage content as a cue to source
reliability. We present a set of experiments examining the relationship between source
information and message content in people’s responses to simple communications. The
results show that people spontaneously revise their beliefs in the reliability of the source on
the basis of the expectedness of a source’s claim and, conversely, adjust message impact
by perceived reliability; hence source reliability and message content have a bi-directional
relationship. The implications are discussed for a variety of psychological, philosophical
and political issues such as belief polarization and dual-route models of persuasion.
Keywords: evidence, argument, source reliability, epistemology, Bayesian models
INTRODUCTION
When a doctor recommends a treatment, a patient does not have to conduct a literature review
before consenting. The patient can use the doctor’s claim and her status as a source to fix the
resulting attitude, belief, or action. Like this patient, we learn not just from our own experience but
also from other people. How do we treat people as sources? When do we (dis-)trust their claims?
These enduring questions arise in classic research on the “wisdom of the crowds” (see, e.g., Galton,
1907), research on judgment and decision making (e.g., Birnbaum et al., 1976; Birnbaum and
Stegner, 1979; Birnbaum and Mellers, 1983), and research on persuasion (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo,
1984, 1986; Chaiken et al., 1989). It should thus come as no surprise that research interest in
trust and source reliability has continued to grow, with fresh impetus in the study of trust in
developmental psychology (for a review, see Mills, 2013), in computer science (for a review, see
Artz and Gil, 2007), and in philosophy (e.g., Coady, 1992; Bovens and Hartmann, 2002, 2003).
Furthermore, in these contexts, there are not only questions about when we do trust people, but
also about whether we do so rationally. How should we integrate other people’s claims into our own
beliefs? These are key questions given that real-world sources are generally less than fully reliable
(see, e.g., Bovens and Hartmann, 2002, 2003).
Collins et al. Messages and Sources
Within psychology, it is the study of persuasion that has
treated sources most extensively. Early theories of persuasion
centered on a putative dichotomy between the content of
persuasive messages and their sources (for a review, see Petty
and Briñol, 2008). Hovland and colleagues, for instance, argued
that persuasion could arise as a function of either learning
a substantive argument or learning simple cues such as the
source’s characteristics (e.g., Kelman and Hovland, 1953). A
dichotomy between message and source became central to
the dominant dual-process theories of persuasion, such as the
Elaboration Likelihood Model (“ELM;” e.g., Petty et al., 1981;
Petty and Cacioppo, 1984, 1986) and the Heuristic-Systematic
Model (e.g., Chaiken et al., 1989). They comprise two routes to
persuasion: central (focused on arguments; analytical, systematic,
high elaboration) and peripheral (focused on general impressions
and surface features; heuristic, low elaboration).
Contemporary dual-process theories recognize that message
content and sources can interact in subtle ways. The ELM
identifies five ways in which sources can induce persuasion (Petty
and Briñol, 2008; Briñol and Petty, 2009). (1) Under conditions
of low elaboration, when recipients are unmotivated or unable to
think about a particular issue, sources can act as simple, heuristic
cues. A classic study showed that, when personal relevance was
low, persuasiveness was due to source reliability; when personal
relevance was high, persuasiveness was due to argument strength,
that is, the actual content of the persuasive message (Petty et al.,
1981). (2) Under conditions of high elaboration, sources can act
as an argument or evidence. When an attractive source testifies
to the effectiveness of a beauty product, the source’s appearance
is visual evidence for the effectiveness of the product (Petty
and Briñol, 2008). In other words, source characteristics can,
occasionally1, have evidential value on the “analytic” route. (3)
Sources can affect metacognition. For example, when source
information comes after an argument, credible sources can
increase people’s confidence in their thoughts (Briñol et al.,
2004). (4) Sources can bias thinking. For example, source
expertise can affect the direction of thoughts, so long as the
message is ambiguous and the task is important (Chaiken and
Maheswaran, 1994). (5) Sources can affect the extent of thinking.
For example, when there are multiple sources for a claim, people
tend to think longer, magnifying differences attributable to
argument strengths: strong arguments become more persuasive;
weak arguments, less persuasive (Harkins and Petty, 1981). In
other words, (4) and (5) allow source information to affect
analytic processing in ways that go beyond evidential value, by
moderating the direction and amount of analytic thinking that
takes place.
Hence, the contemporary ELM provides a subtler account
of sources than earlier perspectives, no longer confining source
information to the peripheral route. But there remain challenges.
Sometimes, for instance, an intuitively good and complex
argument depends principally (or even solely) on information
about its source, as when arguments for anthropogenic climate
change are based on the beliefs of climate scientists (see Hahn
1This exceptionality is also apparent in studies which investigate debiasing from
source characteristics (e.g., Petty et al., 1998).
et al., 2015). Other times both content and source information
seem relevant. In such cases, how should we combine the
information; how separable are the two types? Where the ELM
has addressed this question, it has suggested that argument and
source provide additive cues. If source characteristics are deemed
“informative and relevant when scrutinized” (such as in the case
of the attractiveneness of the person advertising beauty products)
they provide an independent potential argument supporting the
advocacy of the message, which “adds to the impact of the
other information” within the analytic route (Petty andWegener,
1998, p. 52). This position is explicitly contrasted with that of
Chaiken’s Heuristic Systematic Model (HSM) where both routes
may interact in processing argument content and source (see
also, Maheswaran and Chaiken, 1991; Ratneshwar and Chaiken,
1991).
The persuasion literature echoes a large and venerable
prescriptive literature on argumentation. In this literature,
arguments are supposed to speak for themselves. Where
arguments rely on source information, they are deemed
fallacious, as, for example, with ad hominem arguments, which
attack the credibility of the source, or appeals to authority, which
are based on the source’s credibility. Such arguments feature
prominently in traditional catalogs of fallacies (e.g., Woods et al.,
2004) and textbooks on critical thinking (e.g., Bowell and Kemp,
2002; Hughes et al., 2010; Rainbolt and Dwyer, 2012). However,
even this tradition increasingly holds that such arguments are
sometimes reasonable, and focuses on distinguishing fallacious
and non-fallacious forms (e.g., Walton, 1998; van Eemeren
et al., 2009). But recent work goes further still, and argues that
source characteristics have evidential value in a broad range
of circumstances (e.g., Hahn et al., 2009, 2013; Oaksford and
Hahn, 2013). This work adopts a normative, Bayesian perspective
which mandates sensitivity to source characteristics in many
argument evaluation contexts. This perspective is echoed in
Bayesian treatments of testimony in the context of developmental
psychology (Shafto et al., 2012), legal testimony (e.g., Schum,
1981; Friedman, 1987; Lagnado et al., 2013), or the value of the
level of consensus among climate scientists (Hahn et al., 2015).
This Bayesian approach to argumentation is an instance of
a more general approach to cognition, where optimal models
are developed and compared with data from participants.
This approach has been applied, for instance, to perception
(e.g., Geisler, 1987), categorization (e.g., Anderson, 1991),
or syllogistic reasoning (Chater and Oaksford, 1999). These
models presuppose Bayesianism on the grounds that, under
certain conditions, Bayesian reasoning is demonstrably optimal
(Rosenkrantz, 1992; Leitgeb and Pettigrew, 2010a,b; for
discussion, see Hahn, 2014). If human behavior approximates
the model, then the optimal model provides a functional
explanation of why human behavior is the way it is. However,
such models are also useful where deviations arise as they can
guide exploration of constraints that underlie the shortfall
between actual and optimal behavior (see, e.g., Geisler, 1987;
Anderson, 1990; Howes et al., 2009).
In argumentation, this approach has given rise to hypotheses
that have prompted experimental research on the influence of
source characteristics in the context of argument (see e.g., Hahn
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et al., 2009; Harris et al., 2012, 2013, 2015). Many of these
hypotheses originate in Bayesian approaches to testimony, that
is, belief updating in response to the saying, uttering, asserting
of a claim by a source of partial reliability (e.g., Bovens and
Hartmann, 2002, 2003; Olsson, 2005). Here, normative Bayesian
models prescribe that message content and source reliability
should be considered together to avoid the mis-calibration of
beliefs. Such models often yield surprising, counter-intuitive
results. For instance, diverse evidence (e.g., evidence from
independent sources) is not always more compelling (Bovens and
Hartmann, 2003), and pieces of testimonial evidence that “fit
together” or cohere are not necessarily more likely to be true (see
e.g., Olsson, 2005; for an empirical investigation of coherence,
see also Harris and Hahn, 2009). Finally, where multiple pieces
of testimonial evidence are concerned, there will, normatively,
be subtle, complex, interactions between the reliability of the
individual witnesses, and how informationally independent they
are from one another (see e.g., Hahn et al., 2015 for an overview).
Initial experimental evidence suggests that people conform, to
some extent, to Bayesian norms. Even when participants evaluate
arguments in fictitious scenarios that should promote conditions
of low personal involvement from the perspective of the ELM,
they are, in fact, sensitive to both message content and message
source, and their behavior shows interactions between content
and source reliability (Hahn et al., 2009). Such behavior is, at
least qualitatively, consistent with Bayesian norms. Specifically,
interactions arise from the multiplicative nature of Bayes’ rule
(the central rule for belief revision in Bayesian models).
In this paper, we consider two specific models which prescribe
consideration of messages and sources together. The models
apply under conditions of uncertainty, and tell us how to update
our beliefs: that we should follow Bayes’ rule. Of course, in the
real world, sources are generally fallible, hence only partially
reliable, but their precise degree of reliability is also not known.
The Bayesian approach does not tell us how to judge the initial
reliability of our sources. Literature on lie detection, for example
in forensic contexts, has considered individual features that
might be informative about whether or not a source is telling
the truth, ranging from personality characteristics to mannerism
or behaviors, such as voice characteristics, gestures, or eye
movements (see, e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2010). But
intuitively relevant, too, is the actual content of what someone
says. This is obviously the case where it is known that what
someone has claimed is actually false. Whether this was based on
an intentional lie or merely an error, it should clearly affect our
views about the reliability of the individual concerned. However,
philosophers concerned with testimony have also taken the view
that wemight already consider relevant to judgments of reliability
any statements that strike us as implausible, even though we are
willing to allow the possibility that they are, in fact, correct.
From the literature on formal epistemology, two related
Bayesian models have embodied this intuition: the model of
Bovens and Hartmann (2003) and that of Olsson and Angere
(reported in, e.g., Olsson, 2011; Olsson and Vallinder, 2013).
These models share a fundamental assumption: that message
content and source reliability interact bi-directionally. On the
one hand, the reliability of the source moderates the evidential
impact of the message content. On the other hand, message
content provides evidence about the reliability of the source.
Effectively, hearing someone say something implausible or
unexpected (e.g., “the Earth is flat”) leads to a reduction in the
probability (subjective degree of belief) that they are reliable.
Both are Bayesian models in that they use Bayes’ rule to update
beliefs both about what it is a source is asserting and about the
source’s reliability. However, they differ in detail, particularly with
respect to what it means for a source to be “unreliable.”
Two Bayesian Models of Source Reliability
The Bovens and Hartmann’s model is illustrated by the simple
Bayesian Belief Network in Figure 1 below2. In this model,
A source makes a report (represented in the network by the
binary variable Rep), “X is true (false):” the state of this binary
report variable depends on both the underlying state of the
world (represented by the node HYP, for “hypothesis”) and the
reliability of the source (represented by the binary variable “Rel”).
If the source is reliable, it is simply assumed to report the true
state of affairs. If the source is unreliable, however, its report has
no systematic connection with the world—it is as though a coin
is flipped to determine whether to assert the truth or the falsity of
what is being reported (though different degrees of bias toward
positive or negative reports can be modeled as well; see Bovens
and Hartmann, 2003, for details).
On hearing a report, the recipient revises both her belief in
the hypothesis and her belief in the reliability of the source.
After an unexpected message [P(HYP) < 0.5], reliability P(REL)
will be revised downward, as in the flat Earth example above.
After a plausible, expected, message [P(HYP)> 0.5], belief in the
source’s reliability will go up. Within the psychological literature,
consequences of this simple model have been explored, for
example, in Jarvstad and Hahn (2011).
Olsson and Angere’s model differs in two principal ways.
Firstly, source reliability is represented not by a binary variable,
but by a distribution over possible reliability profiles, updated
via Bayesian inference. Secondly, unreliability does not lead to
FIGURE 1 | Bayesian belief network of testimony from Bovens and Hartmann
(2003).
2Bayesian belief networks are graphical models that simplify Bayesian
computations by characterizing independence relations between variables.
Nodes represent variables; links represent dependencies between variables,
typically causal connections. For an introduction see e.g., (Korb and Nicholson,
2010).
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randomization. In Bovens’ and Hartmann’s model, “unreliable”
means uncorrelated with the truth: unreliability bottoms out at
P = 0.5. In Olsson and Angere’s model, unreliability bottoms out
at P = 0: a maximally unreliable source is negatively correlated
with the truth. We will call this “anti-reliability.” Here, the
response is to take the report as evidence of the opposite of
what is being asserted. For example, a used-car dealer saying
that one vehicle is better than the other is taken as evidence of
the opposite. Unreliability in the sense of random responding
is simply one of many possible reliability profiles along the
continuum from “completely reliable” to “anti-reliable,” and a
given source can, in principle, adopt any point along the way.
Together the models raise empirical questions about what
people do. Do people use message content to revise their beliefs
about a source, and, in particular, do they do so even in a
minimal context where there is no other information? If they
do so, do they use message content to revise beliefs about
reliability both upwards and downwards? And, finally, under
what circumstances, if any, are they willing to consider sources
to be anti-reliable?
These questions are of theoretical interest: they are important
not only to projects within epistemology aimed at understanding
the concept of “knowledge,” but also to the models of the impact
of source characteristics on rational argument that have been
built around them (e.g., Harris et al., 2012, 2015). And these,
in turn, as discussed above, are of interest to anyone concerned
with persuasion and the role of source characteristics in the
psychological processing of persuasive messages. However, the
question of whether there is a bi-directional relationship between
message content and perceived source reliability is also of wider
societal importance. Perceived anti-reliability, for instance, may
help to explain belief polarization, whereby collectives might find
themselves split into groups of ever more extreme, diametrically
opposing views (for a discussion of belief polarization in US
politics, see Mann and Ornstein, 2012). Polarization may ensue
rapidly once opponents, say, Republicans and Democrats take
evidence offered by the other group to, anti-reliably, be evidence
to the contrary. Indeed, simulations with societies of artificial
agents based on the Olsson and Angere model typically develop
this kind of belief polarization within the group (Olsson and
Vallinder, 2013; see also Hahn and Harris, 2014). It thus matters
greatly, from a practical perspective, whether anti-reliability
requires special kinds of evidence, or whether it might arise
simply from the fact that the content of communications seems
unexpected.
This paper presents a series of experiments that explore
whether message content influences perceived source reliability
and vice versa. Experiment 1a examined the extent to which
participants changed their beliefs in response to claims presented
bymore or less reliable (expert, trustworthy) sources. Experiment
1b examined whether participants revised their perceptions of
source reliability after expected and unexpected claims (low/high
prior probability). Experiment 2a and 2b provide a replication.
Experiment 3, finally, employed a different method, which
avoided any overt reference to source reliability, to examine
further the extent to which participants spontaneously use
message content to revise beliefs about message source.
The main hypotheses, following on from Bovens and
Hartmann’s (BH) and Olsson and Angere’s (OA) basic models,
were as follows:
Experiments 1a and 2a examined the effects of reliability
on beliefs. Specifically, they tested the prediction that reliable
sources should increase belief in a claim. This prediction is
common to both the BH and OA models. Only the OA model,
however, predicts that unreliable sources could decrease belief
in a claim, that is, unreliable sources may be viewed as “anti-
reliable” prompting belief change in the opposite direction of
what they assert. The alternative prediction of the BH model
is that maximally unreliable sources are simply viewed as
uninformative, so that beliefs do not change in response to
messages from them.
Experiment 1b and 2b examined the converse relationship,
that is, the effects of claims on perceived reliability. For
both models (BH and OA) expected claims should increase
source reliability and unexpected claims should decrease source
reliability.
Experiment 3, finally, tested for implicit effects of message
content on source reliability by examining the impact of a
message on beliefs as a function of a preceding message by the
same source. On both accounts (BH and OA) a second claim
should be more convincing following an expected claim. Only
the OA account additionally allows for possible anti-reliability
such that an initial unexpected claim could change the valence
of a second claim.
EXPERIMENTS 1A AND B
The aim of Experiments 1a and 1b was to examine the
(putatively) tight connection between source and content with
a single set of materials involving a factorial combination
of expected/unexpected claim and reliable/unreliable source.
Participants were either asked to evaluate the claim (Exp. 1a) or
the source (Exp. 1b). These materials could be used to examine
either the effect of reliability on message convincingness or the
effect of message convincingness on source reliability, depending
on the claim (Exp. 1a) or the source (Exp. 1b).
Methods
Both experiments followed a 2 × 2 between-subjects design
with the following factors: Claim Expectedness (Expected,
Unexpected) and Source Reliability (High, Low).
Experiment 1a: Belief in a Claim
Participants
Ninety-nine people (45 women; average 38.63) gave informed
consent and completed online surveys hosted on a US-
hosted website for academic research (http://psych.hanover.
edu/research/exponnet.html), with participants largely recruited
through university e-mail lists at Lund University, Sweden.
Materials and Procedure
Participants read brief texts about six topics. Each text took
the following form. Participants first read a claim and rated its
convincingness by responding to the question “How convincing
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is the claim?” on a Likert-style scale from 0 (not at all convincing)
to 10 (completely convincing). For example,
“One of the best remedies against a severe cough is valium.”
Participants were then presented with a source making this claim:
Now imagine that Michael, who is a clinical nurse specialist, told
you the following: “One of the best remedies against a severe cough
is valium.”
Following this, participants re-rated the convincingness of the
claim on the same Likert-scale.
Other participants saw corresponding versions of the same
scenario that differed in the reliability of the source and/or the
expectedness of the claim. For the present example, the expected
claim was “One of the best remedies against a severe cough is
lots to drink, hot or cold,” and the unexpected claim was “One
of the best remedies against severe cough is valium.” The reliable
source was “Michael, who is a clinical nurse specialist,” whereas
an unreliable source was “Michael, who is a drug addict.”
Each participant saw a set of six such scenarios drawn from
one of the four conditions; half of the participants saw the
same sets with the respective orders reversed to control for
order effects. The initial ratings act as a manipulation check,
with reliable differences in expectedness in the anticipated
directions. These data are summarized in Table 1, Appendix 2 in
Supplementary Material.
For the full set of materials, see the Appendix in
Supplementary Material3.
Experiment 1b: Perceived Reliability
Participants
One hundred and thirty-one people (45 women; average age
39.83) gave informed consent and completed online surveys
hosted on a US-hosted website for academic research (http://
psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html), with participants
largely recruited through university e-mail lists at Lund
University, Sweden.
Materials and Procedure
Participants read texts on the same six topics as in Experiment 1a.
The only difference concerned the dependent variables. Instead
of providing an initial judgment on the convincingness of the
claim, the participants first read about the source and rated its
reliability by responding to the question “How reliable do you
think [source name] is?” on a Likert-style scale from 0 (not at
all reliable) to 10 (completely reliable). Next, participants read
the same source information again, but this time together with
3As will be clear from the Appendix in Supplementary Material, the items differ in
how they implemented expectedness. In some cases, expectedness was determined
by presumed background knowledge; in other cases, by information present in
the items themselves. The cause of the expectedness does not matter from the
point of view of probability theory or the models. Nevertheless, it is plausible
that the different causes give rise to different psychological processing. We leave
exploration of this issue to future work.
a claim. For example, having read that “Michael is a drug addict,”
some participants read the following:
Now imagine that Michael told you the following: “One of the best
remedies against a severe cough is valium.”
Participants re-rated source reliability on the same Likert scale.
No definition of “reliability” was provided. As in 1a, each
participant saw a script with six texts, with two orders of
presentation to control for order effects. For the full set of
materials, see the Appendix in Supplementary Material. Once
again, the initial ratings act as a manipulation check, with reliable
differences in reliability in the anticipated directions. These
data are summarized in Table 1, Appendix 2 in Supplementary
Material.
Results
We chose to run Bayesian analyses for all experiments reported
in this paper: specifically, robust Bayesian parameter estimation.
The analyses are, in effect, Bayesian equivalents of classical one-
sample t-tests (for Experiments 1 and 2) and independent-
sample t-tests (for Experiment 3). The Bayesian analyses are
useful because they provide richer information than the classical
tests—posterior distributions over parameter values—and are not
dependent either on assumptions about the data (e.g., normality)
or on sampling intentions (Kruschke, 2013). The Bayesian
analyses are also invaluable when testing models, because the
analyses can lead to both rejection and acceptance of the null
hypothesis (Kruschke, 2013).
For Experiments 1a and b, we calculated change scores by
subtracting the initial item rating from the final item rating. We
then averaged across items (scenarios) to create a mean change
score for each participant. We then entered the data into analyses
following the guidelines in Kruschke (2013). These analyses do
not assume that the data are normally distributed, but instead
describe the data with a t-distribution, which allows heavy tails.
T-distributions have three parameters: the mean, µ; standard
deviation, σ ; and normality, ν. Where the value of the normality
parameter is large (ca. 100), the distribution is nearly normal;
where it small, the distribution is heavy tailed (Kruschke, 2013).
The one-group analyses for Experiments 1a and b estimate the
most credible parameter values, given the data, for the following
model:
Pr (µ, σ , ν|D) =
Pr (D|µ, σ , ν) × Pr(µ, σ , ν)
Pr(D)
The denominator is approximated using Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, which simulate thousands of
combinations of parameter values (for more technical details, see
Kruschke, 2013). We ran the analyses in R (R Core Team, 2015)
and JAGS using the packages BEST (Meredith and Kruschke,
2013) and rjags (Plummer, 2003). We used the default values
of the BEST programs (see Kruschke, 2013). By default, the
MCMC chain has 100,000 steps, with no thinning to correct
for autocorrelation. The default priors are uninformative. Since
this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to these
content/source predictions, uninformative priors are justified.
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The prior for µ is centered on the mean of the data, the spread
being determined by the precision equivalent to 100 times the
standard deviation; for σ it is a broad uniform distribution from
1/1,000 to 1,000 times the standard deviation of the data; for ν it
is an exponential distribution giving roughly equal credibility to
nearly normal and heavy-tailed distributions (for further details,
see Kruschke, 2013).
The remainder of this section reprises the predictions,
and reports the corresponding posteriors for the parameters.
To decide whether the parameter estimates (dis-)confirm the
predictions, we need two further concepts: the highest density
interval (HDI) and the regional of practical equivalence (ROPE).
The HDI spans the most credible (highest probability) values
of the posterior distribution: for instance, a 95% HDI, which
we will use throughout, covers 95% of the distribution, and
the values within it have a total probability of 0.95 (Kruschke,
2013, 2015). When assessing predictions, we can ask whether the
95% HDI includes a specific point value: for example, for the
null hypothesis, zero. In reality, requiring a point value may be
too stringent. In such cases, a ROPE can prove helpful: values
within this region are considered practically equivalent to the
comparison value. Kruschke (2015) recommends that, in the
absence of clear guidelines in the field, researchers establish a
ROPE around the comparison value, from −0.1 to 0.1. Below,
we will apply the ROPE to effect sizes, so that the relevant
comparison value will be zero with a ROPE from −0.1 to +0.1.
We will base our evaluations of the experimental predictions on
these effect sizes and corresponding ROPEs. If the 95% HDI falls
entirely outside of the ROPE, there is a clear effect; if it falls
entirely within the ROPE, there is a null effect. In this case, the
95% HDI for effect size falls outside this conventional ROPE.
Where there is overlap, the data do not allow a clear decision for
the specific HDI and ROPE. It may, nevertheless, be informative
to consider how much overlap there is, as this will give some
indication of weaker conclusions.
Experiment 1a: Belief in Claim
(1) Reliable sources should increase belief in a claim
(2) (i) Unreliable sources should decrease belief in a claim. OR
(ii) Unreliable sources should not affect belief in a claim.
Figure 2 shows the mean belief change for the claim (collapsed
across claim expectedness).
These means show the predicted increase in belief in the claim
in response to testimonial evidence from a reliable source, and
a decrease in response to the same evidence when coming from
an unreliable source. In other words, the data are suggestive of
anti-reliability (2i).
We statistically evaluated these findings with two one-group
analyses with a comparison value of 0, analogous to classical
one-sample t-tests4.
4The original design aimed to test a somewhat more complex set of predictions
than discussed here; hence the 2 × 2 design. However, these predictions required
lower scores on prior ratings than were actually achieved. The one-way predictions
are appropriate to the achieved values. Descriptives for the full design are
contained in Appendix 2 in Supplementary Material.
FIGURE 2 | Mean belief change for reliable and unreliable sources. Error bars
are standard error.
Reliable sources
The mean estimate for µ was 1.84 (95% HDI [1.37, 2.3]).
The modal estimate for σ 1.39 (95% HDI [1.01, 1.81]). The
modal estimate for log10(ν) was 1.37 (95% HDI [0.42, 2,04]).
Lastly, themodal estimate for effect size—(µ-0)/σ–was 1.31 (95%
HDI [0.87, 1.8]), which falls outside the conventional ROPE.
Figure 3A shows the posterior distribution for effect size and the
ROPE. This analysis, then, shows that reliable sources credibly
increased belief in a claim.
Unreliable sources
The mean estimate for µ was −0.72 (95% HDI [−1.15, −0.29]).
The modal estimate for σ was 1.46 (95% HDI [0.97, 1.88]).
The modal estimate for ν was 1.36 (95% HDI [0.37, 1.99]).
Lastly, the modal estimate for effect size was −0.49 (95% HDI
[−0.87, −0.17]), which falls outside the conventional ROPE.
Figure 3B shows the posterior distribution for effect size and the
ROPE. Thus, this analysis shows that unreliable sources credibly
decreased belief in a claim.
Summary
These data therefore support both predictions (1) and (2)(i):
reliable sources increased belief in a claim; unreliable sources
decreased belief in a claim. The data offer support, then, for
source anti-reliability.
Experiment 1b: Perceived Reliability
(3) Expected claims should increase source reliability
(4) Unexpected claims should decrease source reliability.
The mean change in the perceived reliability of the source as a
function of claim expectedness or unexpectedness is shown in
Figure 4 below. These means are in keeping with (3) and (4):
expected claims led to increases in source reliability, unexpected
claims to decreases.
We again statistically evaluated the predictions with two one-
group analyses with a comparison value of 0.
Expected claims
The mean estimate for µ was 0.45 (95% HDI [0.18, 0.74]).
The modal estimate for σ was .93 (95% HDI [0.75, 1.18]).
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FIGURE 3 | Posterior distributions of effect size for belief change from reliable sources (A) and unreliable sources (B). ROPE from −0.1 to 0.1. Black bar represents
95% HDI.
FIGURE 4 | Mean change in perceived reliability for expected and unexpected
claims. Error bars are standard error.
The modal estimate for log10(ν) was 1.53. The modal estimate
for effect size was 0.49 (95% HDI [0.15, 0.79]), which
falls outside the conventional ROPE. Figure 5A shows the
posterior distribution for effect size and the ROPE. Thus, this
analysis shows that expected claims credibly increased source
reliability.
Unexpected claims
The mean estimate for µ was −1.12 (95% HDI [−1.43,
−0.8]). The modal estimate for σ was 1.37 (95% HDI
[1.09, 1.65]). The modal estimate for log10(ν) was 1.16
(95% HDI [0.59, 1.96]). The modal estimate for effect size
was −0.82 (95% HDI [−1.11, −0.56]), which falls outside
the conventional ROPE. Figure 5B shows the posterior
distribution for effect size and the ROPE. Thus, this analysis
shows that unexpected claims credibly decreased source
reliability.
Summary
These data therefore support predictions (3) and (4). Expected
claims increased source reliability; unexpected claims decreased
source reliability.
Discussion
This study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to test and find
support for the view that there is a two-way relationship between
claims and sources. Not only do sources affect people’s response
to claims; claims affect people’s judgments of a source’s reliability.
These data also serve to distinguish between alternative
models of source reliability. As we have seen, these models
principally differ with respect to unreliable sources. In Bovens
and Hartmann (2003) an unreliable source is taken to be
uninformative with respect to the truth of a claim, so that
reports from an unreliable source cease to have any impact
on an agent’s beliefs. Olsson and Angere (reported, e.g., in
Olsson, 2011), in contrast, go further and allow source anti-
reliability: fully unreliable sources should make people actively
disbelieve the claim. Our results suggest that, at least in some
circumstances, people are happy to consider sources anti-reliable,
even in minimal contexts such as the ones we studied.
EXPERIMENTS 2A AND B
The novelty of the findings argues for replication. Experiments 2a
and b sought to replicate the effects using a different sample. The
data from Exp. 1 were collected via a university-hosted website
for online experimental studies, with a sample consisting largely
of self-selecting, interested volunteers from Lund University
students and staff. Experiments 2a and b were posted on Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Although samples onMechanical Turk are also
not representative of the general population, they are considered
more diverse than college samples (Paolacci and Chandler, 2014),
and, most importantly, are likely to be different in composition
than the sample of Exp. 1a and b. This offers a useful further test
of the effects.
Methods
The experiments followed the same design as Experiments 1a and
b: a 2x2 between-subjects design with the following factors: Claim
Expectedness (Expected, Unexpected) and Source Reliability
(High, Low). Experiment 2a and 2b used the same materials and
procedure as Experiment 1a/b. Two minor changes were made
to the materials to adapt them for a predominantly US audience.
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Firstly, for the Stockholm item, temperatures were given in both
Centigrade and Fahrenheit. Secondly, for the nightclub item, US
locations were given: Manhattan as an expected location for a
prestigious nightclub, and Des Moines, Iowa, as an unexpected
location. The Range Rover item was also removed because, in
Experiments 1a and b, participants’ prior beliefs showed that
the intended expectedness manipulation had not worked. For
the exact materials see the Appendix in Supplementary Material.
Once again, the initial ratings act as a manipulation check,
with reliable differences in expectedness and reliability in the
anticipated directions. These data are summarized in Table 1,
Appendix 2 in Supplementary Material.
Experiment 2a
Participants
Seventy-nine people (27 women; average age 33.38) gave
informed consent and completed online surveys posted on
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk as a small job (HIT). The HIT
was posted by an intermediary, MTurk Data. Participants were
rewarded with a small fee equivalent to $0.20 per minute,
calculated to exceed the rate of the US minimum wage. To
maximize engagement and maximize the number of native
English speakers, high qualifications were posted. To complete
the task, participants needed to be resident in the US, Canada
or UK, have a 99% approval rating for their previous HITs, and
to have completed 10,000 approved HITs. One participant’s data
(not included in the above count) was excluded because that
participant reported a first language other than English.
Experiment 2b
Participants
Seventy-nine people (31 women; average 35.09) gave informed
consent and completed online surveys posted on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk as a small job (HIT). Participants were recruited
and rewarded in the same way as Experiment 2a. In addition,
a qualification guaranteed that people could not participate if
they had previously completed Experiment 2a. As above, one
participant’s data (not included in the above count) was excluded
because that participant reported a first language other than
English.
Results
We analyzed the data using the same method, model and
programs as Experiments 1a and b. Recall that the method
estimates the parameter values for the mean (µ), standard
deviation (σ ) and normality (ν).
Experiment 2a
(1) Reliable sources should increase belief in a claim.
(2) (i) Unreliable sources should decrease belief in a claim. OR
(ii) Unreliable sources should not affect belief in a claim.
Figure 6 shows the descriptive data for Experiments 2a.
Qualitatively, the same patterns are observed as in Exp. 1 a.
Reliable sources
The mean estimate for µ was 2.23 (95% HDI [1.76, 2.7]).
The modal estimate for σ 1.39 (95% HDI [1.09,1.79]). The
modal estimate for log10(ν) was 1.49 (95% HDI [0.75, 2.1]).
Lastly, themodal estimate for effect size—(µ-0)/σ–was 1.58 (95%
HDI [1.08, 2.1]), which falls outside the conventional ROPE.
Figure 7A shows the posterior distribution for effect size and the
ROPE. This analysis, then, shows that reliable sources credibly
increased belief in a claim.
FIGURE 6 | Mean belief change for reliable and unreliable sources. Error bars
are standard error.
FIGURE 5 | Posterior distributions of effect size for change in perceived reliability from expected claims (A) and unexpected claims (B). ROPE from −0.1 to 0.1. Black
bar represents 95% HDI.
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Unreliable sources
The mean estimate for µ was −1.73 (95% HDI [−2.28, −1.18]).
The modal estimate for σ was 1.58 (95% HDI [1.21, 2.11]). The
modal estimate for ν was 1.48 (95% HDI [0.6, 2.07]). Lastly,
the modal estimate for effect size was −1.08 (95% HDI [−1.53,
−6.3]), which falls outside the conventional ROPE. Figure 7B
shows the posterior distribution of effect size and the ROPE. This
analysis shows that unreliable sources credibly decreased belief in
a claim.
Summary
These data therefore support both predictions (1) and (2): reliable
sources increased belief in a claim; unreliable sources decreased
belief in a claim. The data replicate the effects in Experiment
1a, providing further support for source anti-reliability and the
Olsson and Angere model.
Experiment 2b: Perceived Reliability
(3) Expected claims should increase source reliability
(4) Unexpected claims should decrease source reliability.
Again, the descriptive data (Figure 8) qualitatively match the
earlier findings.
Expected claims
The mean estimate for µ was 0.51 (95% HDI [0.2, 0.83]). The
modal estimate for σ was 0.89 (95% HDI [0.66, 1.19]). The
modal estimate for log10(ν) was 1.51. The modal estimate for
effect size was 0.56 (95% HDI [0.19, 97]), which falls outside the
conventional ROPE. Figure 9A shows the posterior distribution
of effect size and the ROPE. Thus, this analysis shows that
expected claims credibly increased source reliability.
Unexpected claims
The mean estimate for µ was −0.2 (95% HDI [−0.64, 0.22]).
The modal estimate for σ was 1.16 (95% HDI [0.65, 1.7]). The
modal estimate for log10(ν) was 0.52 (95% HDI [0.12, 1.77]).
The modal estimate for effect size was −0.18 (95% HDI [−0.53,
0.18]). Although this modal estimate is for a small effect, the 95%
HDI includes an effect size of 0. Indeed, the 95% includes the
entire ROPE (−0.1 to 0.1). It is therefore not possible to reject
the null hypothesis. But since the 95% also includes effect sizes
outside of the ROPE, it is also not possible to confirm the null
hypothesis. Figure 9B shows the posterior distribution and the
ROPE. Accordingly, these data do not allow us tomake a decision
on the effect of unexpected claims.
Summary
These data support prediction (3) but (in contrast to Exp. 1b) do
not allow a decision on prediction (4). Expected claims increased
source reliability; but there was no statistical evidence for (or
against) unexpected claims decreasing reliability.
Discussion
Experiments 2a and 2b broadly support the findings of
Experiments 1a and 1b. Participants used source reliability when
assessing claim strength, and can consider sources to be anti-
reliable or negatively correlated with the truth. Participants also
used message content to form impressions of source reliability.
The data are also more consistent with Olsson and Angere’s
normative model of source reliability than with Bovens and
Hartmann’s.
On one point, Experiments 1b and 2b differ slightly. In
Experiment 1b, participants responded to unexpected claims
by revising their perception of source reliability downwards.
FIGURE 8 | Mean change in perceived reliability for expected and unexpected
claims. Error bars are standard error.
FIGURE 7 | Posterior distributions of effect size for belief change from reliable sources (A) and unreliable sources (B). ROPE from −0.1 to 0.1. Black bar represents
95% HDI.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 January 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 18
Collins et al. Messages and Sources
FIGURE 9 | Posterior distributions of effect size for change in perceived reliability from expected claims (A) and unexpected claims (B). ROPE from −0.1 to 0.1. Black
bar represents 95% HDI.
In Experiment 2b, although the estimate of effect size
suggested a downgrading of source reliability, the data did
not allow a decision between that hypothesis and the null
hypothesis.
The experiments thus far have tested participants’ responses
to single claims. Participants readily revised their beliefs and
perceptions of source reliability. For this mechanism to play
a major role in belief revision, however, these beliefs and
perceptions should hold across multiple interactions. The next
experiment explores this possibility.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 3 built on the materials of the previous experiments
but moved to a new experimental paradigm. In particular,
we wanted to examine further the extent to which people
spontaneously use message content to revise their beliefs
about a source. We thus used an experimental paradigm
that avoided all mention of source reliability. To this end,
the task involved multiple claims by the same source. We
sought to test for effects of message content on perceived
reliability by manipulating the expectedness/unexpectedness of
the initial claim and testing for subsequent differences on a
second claim, which was the same claim in all conditions. Any
systematic differences on this second claim reflect spontaneous
and implicit revision of perceived reliability as the scenario
described in the text unfolds. There was no probe of either
reliability or convincingness for the first claim, nor did the
experimental procedure pause on it in any way. In effect, Exp.
3 combines the questions addressed separately in the preceding
experiments—namely whether source reliability matters and
whether claim expectedness affects reliability—into a single
study. As any potential effects of message expectedness on
reliability are entirely implicit, the study allows insight into the
extent to which people naturally revise their opinions about
the reliability of sources on the basis of message content and
factor these in to the processing of subsequent messages by those
sources.
To accommodate multiple claims, we changed the structure of
the task. Participants now read items such as the following:
Imagine you hear Michael, who is a clinical nurse specialist, telling
someone “One of the best remedies for a severe cough is valium.”
Later, Michael tells you the following: “The new medicine Fluentem
can prevent heart attacks and strokes.”
The first claim manipulated expectedness: here, the claim
is unexpected. The second claim was intended to be
neutral: we aimed at a prior probability of around 0.5
(representing maximum uncertainty about the truth or
falsity of the claim). Participants rated their belief in the second
claim.
We predicted that participants would implicitly respond
to the expectedness of the first claim, considering it in
their view of the proponent’s source reliability, and that this
source reliability would feed into their assessment of the
second claim. Hence, an expected first claim would increase
belief in the second claim; an unexpected first claim would
decrease it.
In content and design, the materials for Exp. 3 were
otherwise based on those of the previous studies. As before,
the design was between-subjects: some participants saw expected
claims followed by neutral claims (the expected condition),
some unexpected followed by neutral claims (the unexpected
condition). To aid interpretation of any implicit revision
of source reliability in response to expected vs. unexpected
claims, we added a third, baseline condition which presented
participants only with the neutral, second claim (the null
condition).
Given this design, three comparisons are possible: the
expected vs. null conditions; the unexpected vs. null conditions;
and the expected vs. unexpected conditions. Perceived reliability
should increase in response to an expected claim and decrease in
response to an unexpected claim. This is in turn should translate
into higher ratings of the neutral second claim in the expected
than in the unexpected condition. The null condition would be
expected to lie between these two, though there are no predictions
concerning how far it should be from either, as it reflects how
trusting people are initially. Given the differences in design, we
anticipated a smaller effect, and therefore increased the sample
size.
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Methods
Participants
Two samples were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk
using the same criteria as for Experiments 2a and b; they
were again remunerated at a rate of $.20 per minute. Two
separate HITs were posted on different days and at different
times of day. Participants were able to participate only
in one HIT, and only if they had not previously taken
part in Experiment 2 a or b. The first sample comprised
120 people (45 women; average age 35.98). The second
sample comprised 296 people (3 gender non-conformist, 123
female; average age 34.81). All participants gave informed
consent. Note that, although classical methods do not allow
samples to be compiled, Bayesian methods do (Kruschke,
2015).
Materials and Procedure
This experiment used the same set of sources and first claims
as Experiments 2a/b. The new, second claim in each pair was
as follows: for the valium item, “The new medicine Fluentem
can prevent heart attacks and strokes;” for the oven item,
“Pimlico Farm superfine flour is the best on the market for
making pasta;” for the horse-racing item, “The yacht Azure
will beat its competitor Orion at this year’s Cowes Week
regatta;” for the Stockholm item, “It rained on 13 days in
Tübingen, Germany, in May 2013;” for the clubbing item,
“Kate Siggs is a rising star on the vibrant Australian jazz
scene.” Participants provided a rating for the second claim
on a scale from 0 (not at all convincing) to 10 (completely
convincing).
To illustrate the new format:
Imagine you hear Robert, who is a senior sports reporter and has
predicted the winner in the last 10 races that he covered, telling
someone the following: “The Australian horse Thunderbolt, who
has beaten the British horse Lightening in the majority of the races
entered this season, will lose to (beat) Lightening in the upcoming
Cheltenham Festival races.”
Later, Robert tells you the following: “The yacht Azure will beat
its competitor Orion at this year’s Cowes Week regatta.”
How convincing is this claim about Azure on a scale from 0 (not
at all convincing) to 10 (completely convincing)?
The initial claims could be expected or unexpected. In a third
condition, there was no initial claim; participants simply rated
the neutral claim. Full materials for all conditions are found in
the Appendix in Supplementary Material.
Results
To analyze the data we averaged the endorsement of the second
claim across items to create a mean score for each participant.We
then ran the analyses on these scores. There are three relevant
analyses: expected condition vs. null condition; unexpected
condition vs. null condition; expected condition vs. unexpected
condition.
As with the one-group analyses, these analyses describe
the data with a t-distribution, and estimate the most credible
parameter values given the data. For the two-group analyses, the
following model applies:
Pr (µ1,µ2, σ1, σ2, ν|D) =
Pr (D|µ1,µ2, σ1, σ 2, ν) × Pr(µ1,µ2, σ1, σ2, ν)
Pr(D)
Subscripts identify group membership. Note that, in this model,
there is only one parameter for normality. The technical details
are the same as for the one-group analyses. The priors are,
likewise, set in the same way. Below, for brevity’s sake, we report
estimates for the differences between µ1 and µ2 and between σ1
and σ2, for the normality parameter, and for the effect size.
Figure 10 shows the descriptive data.
The descriptive data show the predicted pattern in that
mean belief was higher in the expected condition, than in the
neutral or unexpected condition. The fact that the unexpected
condition showed lower mean belief than the null condition is
also suggestive of “anti-reliability.”
However, only the contrast between expected and unexpected
is statistically reliable, so that no firm conclusions about anti-
reliability can be reached in this study.
In detail, the analyses yielded the following.
Expected vs. Null
The mean estimate for difference in means (µexpected – µnull) was
0.09 (95% HDI [−0.33, 0.51]). Note that the 95% HDI includes a
difference of zero. The modal estimate for difference in standard
deviations (σexpected – σnull) was −0.25 (95% HDI [−0.54, 0.07]).
The modal estimate for ν was 1.72 (95% HDI [1.22, 2.17]).
The modal estimate for effect size was .059 (95% HDI [−0.19,
0.29]). Figure 11 shows the posterior distribution of effect size
and the ROPE. Since the 95% HDI for effect size encompasses a
conventional ROPE, there is insufficient evidence to determine
an effect of preceding expected claims here.
Unexpected vs. Null
The mean estimate for difference in means (µnull – µunexpected)
was 0.56 (95% HDI [0.12, 0.98]), suggesting a credible difference
in means, with the unexpected condition lower than the
FIGURE 10 | Mean belief in claim by expectedness condition. Error bars are
standard error.
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null condition. The modal estimate for difference in standard
deviations (σnull – σunexpected) was 0.13 (95% HDI [−0.19, 0.44]).
The modal estimate for ν was 1.73 (95% HDI [1.23, 2.18]). The
modal estimate for effect size was 0.32 (95% HDI [0.07, 0.55]).
Notice that the 95%HDI excludes an effect size of zero. However,
it also overlaps with the conventional ROPE (−0.1 to 0.1) by 0.3.
Figure 12 shows the posterior distribution of effect size and the
ROPE. Although these data are suggestive, they do not allow us
to decide whether or not there is a credible difference between
unexpected and null conditions.
Expected vs. Unexpected
Themean estimate for difference inmeans (µexpected –µunexpected)
was 0.64 (95% HDI [0.24, 1.05]). The modal estimate for
difference in standard deviations (σexpected – σunexpected) was−0.1
(95% HDI [−0.4, 0.2]). The modal estimate for ν was 1.63 (95%
HDI [1.1, 2.13]). The modal estimate for effect size was 0.38 (95%
HDI [0.14, 0.63]). The 95% HDI falls outside the conventional
ROPE. Figure 13 shows the posterior distribution of the effect
size and the ROPE. There is therefore a credible difference
between expected and unexpected conditions.
FIGURE 11 | Posterior distribution of effect size for difference between
expected and null conditions. ROPE from −0.1 to 0.1. Black bar represents
95% HDI.
FIGURE 12 | Posterior distribution of effect size for difference between
unexpected and null conditions. ROPE from −0.1 to 0.1. Black bar represents
95% HDI.
Discussion
Experiment 3 tested whether participants used perceptions of
source reliability generated by a first claim when they assessed
a second claim. The expectedness of the first claim affected how
participants rated a second claim, indicating that participants
implicitly evaluated the first claim in its implications for
the source’s reliability and updated their beliefs in reliability
accordingly. They then brought the resultant beliefs about
reliability to bear on their evaluation of a subsequent claim by this
source. Claim expectedness thus seems to moderate spontaneous
perceptions of reliability even where reliability is not the focus of
attention.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Most of the time, arguments, and persuasive messages more
generally, come to us from others. As sources, these others will
typically be only partially reliable. Understanding how people
deal with the perceived reliability of sources is thus an important
issue not just for psychology, but also for related disciplines.
The experiments presented tested how people’s behavior
corresponds to two Bayesian models for handling claims from
sources that are only partially reliable. These models posit a
Bayesian update process that uses the content of messages
or arguments we receive to update both our beliefs about
the relevant content (including its implications for other
propositions) and our beliefs about the reliability of the reporting
source. Our data suggest a reasonable fit between participants’
behavior and Olsson and Angere’s model of source reliability.
Experiments 1a and 2a showed that participants clearly revised
their belief upwards given messages from reliable sources
and downwards given messages from unreliable sources. This
downward revision, or source anti-reliability, is the crucial
distinction between the two models: source anti-reliability
suggests a closer correspondence with Olsson and Angere’s
model.
Experiments 1b and 2b broadly supported the predictions of
both models concerning belief revision about source reliability.
FIGURE 13 | Posterior distribution of effect size for difference between
expected and unexpected conditions. ROPE from −0.1 to 0.1. Black bar
represents 95% HDI.
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The clearest effect was expected claims improving ratings of
source reliability: both experiments supported this result. There
was a less clear effect of unexpected claims lowering ratings of
source reliability: Experiment 1b showed a statistically credible
effect, but the data in Experiment 2b did not allow a decision
either way. Experiment 3 tested whether participants behaved
similarly when assessing two claims from the same source.
In this study, source reliability was entirely implicit. Again a
difference was found in belief in a message endorsed by a
source, depending on whether that source had previously uttered
something expected or unexpected.
In short, when people process messages from others, their
processing shows a bi-directional relationship between message
content and message source, even in minimal contexts. In the
following, we discuss the implications of our findings, both in
theoretical and in practical terms.
First, the results seem directly relevant to the practical concern
of belief polarization, a phenomenon seen in many real world
domains such as politics (see, e.g., Mann and Ornstein, 2012).
If people downgrade the perceived reliability of others on the
basis of message content this will foster polarization, because
opposing views will be discounted (Hahn and Harris, 2014). This
process is distinct from having other types of information that
might make one downgrade perceived reliability, such as being
told that a person has lied or been proven wrong in the past.
Specifically, the unexpected messages used in our study were not
known by participants to be wrong; they weremerely unexpected:
in particular, they did not receive ratings of 0 in the initial belief
assessment (Experiment 1a:M= 2.96; Experiment 2a:M= 4.31).
In this sense, it is not “track record” of past accuracy that is
being monitored but only an expectation about accuracy, that
is, a “likely track record.” The range of cases where this kind of
revision about source reliability would be possible is vastly greater
than the number of cases where we have specific information that
what someone has just said is wrong. The potential contribution
to polarization of the mechanism observed in this paper is
consequently considerable. Polarization in the real world will be
further accelerated where people are willing to credit others with
differing opinions with “anti-reliability,” because now evidence
provided by a particular source is taken to constitute actual
evidence to the contrary (“ If X says climate change is real, it must
be a lie”). Again, this seems a likely contributing factor in political
views and debate.
On a theoretical level, the results match intuitions in present
Bayesian models of testimonial evidence (Bovens and Hartmann,
2003; Olsson and Vallinder, 2013). This carries through to the
models of argument that have incorporated aspects of the BH
model, such as those experimentally tested in Harris et al. (2012)
and Harris et al. (2015). Of course, alternative Bayesian accounts
differ in detail (such as the difference with respect to anti-
reliability we considered here). Which account is preferable from
a normative perspective requires further consideration. However,
descriptively, we found at least some evidence of anti-reliability.
At the same time these and other Bayesian accounts (including
for example, Schum, 1981; Shafto et al., 2012; Fenton et al., 2013)
all share the basic property that source and content factors will
never have just a simple additive relationship. This fundamental
feature stems from the multiplicative nature of Bayes’ rule as the
“engine” of Bayesian models.
Data from past experimental studies are compatible with
such multiplicative relationships. Particularly relevant are studies
which examine the relationship between argument content and
argument source from a Bayesian perspective (e.g., Hahn et al.,
2009; Harris et al., 2013). Such studies have found statistical
interactions between argument content and argument source.
Manipulating argument quality and source reliability gives rise to
non-additive effects on perceived argument strength: high quality
arguments from reliable sources are more convincing than an
additive model would predict.
This multiplicative relationship conflicts with ELM postulates
for a number of reasons. First, the materials of those studies
involve hypothetical scenarios that should be considered low
personal involvement and hence low elaboration. Hahn et al.
(2009) study, for example, involves a (fictitious) high energy
sports drink “FIZZ” whose qualities are recommended either
through a message giving facts and figures or reporting
(anonymous) personal opinions—in line with argument quality
considerations put forward in the ELM literature (Petty
et al., 1981, p. 850). For the source manipulation, these
arguments are put forward either in a “circular email from
excitingnews@wowee.com” in the low reliability condition or,
in the high reliability condition a “report by an independent
consumer watchdog.” It thus seems unlikely that the observed
interactions between argument content and source could be
generated because the source manipulation gave rise to the
materials being processed in very different ways. Yet these
argumentation results are clearly relevant to the ELM: what is
studied in the context of “rational argument” within cognitive
psychology is not an alternative to persuasion; it is a subset of
persuasion—namely that subset that rests on argument quality
within the domain of “analytic processing.”
In the present paper, Experiments 1 and 2, again motivated
by a Bayesian perspective, demonstrate a further type of
interaction betweenmessage source andmessage content, namely
the observed bi-directional relationship. This relationship,
too, conflicts with the ELM. Again, the materials are “low
involvement.” This in itself makes it somewhat surprising that
they show effects predicted by models that are aimed at analytic
processing. However, it is also not clear how a dual-route model
that, by default, factors source and content considerations into
alternative routes can naturally deal with our results. Of course,
it is easy enough from an ELM perspective to explain the effects
of source reliability on message convincingness through heuristic
processing that treats source reliability as a simple cue. However,
it is more difficult to explain the reverse direction: how message
convincingness affects source reliability. Why should the mere
plausibility of message content have an effect on source reliability,
and why should that feed back into the evaluation of further
content?
Experiment 3 emphasizes further this difficulty for the ELM.
Differences in perceived source reliability give rise to differential
effects on message convincingness, yet the relevant difference
in source reliability is only brought about by differences in
(prior) message content. In other words, message content must
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be processed to infer source reliability, which is then brought to
bear on the subsequent simple message. This is further evidence
of a bi-directional relationship between content and source:
a relationship that surfaces in materials that the ELM would
assign to a single (peripheral, heuristic) route. The ELM, then,
seems to drive too large a wedge between source and content
considerations. From a Bayesian perspective, source and content
should be tightly coupled, and our data suggest that they are
indeed much more richly inter-twined than the standard model
of persuasion has assumed.
Much remains to be done with respect to a full understanding
of the relationship betweenmessage content and source reliability
information in argumentation and persuasion. What exactly are
the boundary conditions for their interaction? Again, we think
consideration of normative models and evidential value will be
useful here. Certainly there are cases in which source information
is obviously relevant: for instance, when an argument from
authority or an ad hominem argument is being made. However,
there are also cases in which source information is not obviously
relevant: say, for instance, a deductively valid argument or
an inductive argument for which the recipient can check all
the relevant facts. Much real world argument, however, lies in
between the two extremes of having to rely entirely on another’s
assessment and being fully able to appreciate an issue oneself.
At the same time, closer scrutiny of normative issues reveals
two distinct aspects of source reliability that bear on persuasion.
We will call the first aspect the testimonial aspect: by this wemean
the evidential value of endorsement. The source, in effect, is the
evidence. Authority X says that Y is the case, and the mere fact
that Authority X says this is the evidence that affects one’s belief in
Y. The evidential value of endorsement by a source will vary with
the reliability of the source. On the plausible assumption that, as
an authority on the topic, X is more likely to be right than wrong,
X’s testimony will carry greater evidential weight than will that
of a non-expert. The second aspect of source reliability, we will
call the transmission aspect. Here the source transmits evidence,
and source reliability considerations influence our beliefs about
the faithfulness of that transmission. For example, when a doctor
determines her beliefs about whether a patient has a particular
disease, she may base her assessment on the outcome of a medical
test. Typically, however, she will not have conducted that test
herself, but merely receives a report of the outcome of such a test.
Normatively, her confidence in the diagnosis should be affected
by the reliability of the reporting source, not just the reported
test result itself; in other words, her confidence in the diagnosis
should be higher where the test result has been communicated
by a reliable lab than by one that is known to have on occasion
mixed up patient materials.
Different strands in prior research have focused on different
aspects of source reliability. The ELM seems to have been
primarily concerned with the testimonial aspect, touching
on transmission only where source considerations are
assumed to affect processing: for example, where source
expertise affects the direction of thoughts (Chaiken and
Maheswaran, 1994). The Bayesian argumentation studies
involving factorial manipulations of argument content and
argument source described earlier (e.g., Hahn et al., 2009) have
been concerned with transmission. The present studies focus on
the testimonial aspect. However, in everyday life, most examples
of persuasive communication will likely involve aspects of
both.
Consequently, a better understanding of the role of source
characteristics in argumentation and persuasion will need to
be aware of, and examine in more detail, these different
facets.
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